What nonviolence is, and is not

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The nonviolent People Power Revolution of 1986, Philippines

The events in Charlottesville have reignited a long-standing debate about the use of force to create social change. There is an immense amount of rage, and impatience. Violence is becoming more accepted as a legitimate way forward. I see it every day on my Facebook- that’s in fact why I wrote this post.

To begin with, I have no deep moral opposition to violence to achieve liberation. I acknowledge a diversity of tactics is useful and that people will disagree on the way forward. However, the advocates of armed resistance have been characterizing nonviolent resistance in an unfair, narrow manner that I’m sure would tick them off if it were applied to their ideas. So this post aims to call attention to the basics- what nonviolence is, what it is not, and to rescue the practice from the strawman heap and put it in its full complexity.

So here are six theses on nonviolence.

Nonviolence is not the same as pacifism. Pacifism is a very long and complex tradition, but in common parlance it has been equated with being peaceful above all else, and not resisting force. One can be a pacifist and practice nonviolent action, but many practitioners are not morally opposed to violence. Nonviolence can be a pragmatic choice, which it is for me.

Nonviolence is not passive. In October 2000, hundreds of thousands of people flooded Belgrade from all over Serbia, intent on overthrowing Slobodan Milosevic. Vastly outnumbered, security forces stepped aside and the people seized the federal parliament building. Paired with mass strikes and grassroots organizing, Milosevic stepped aside, doing what a brutal NATO bombing campaign had been unable to. The Bulldozer Revolution, named because activists brought heavy machinery to break up checkpoints and barricades, was nonviolent. Nobody would call the actions of the Serbian people passive. They took the initiative, dictated terms of surrender, and defeated a regime that had survived violent attacks from the world’s most advanced militaries. Most of them had no moral opposition to violence. They used nonviolence because it worked.

Nonviolence can be, and often is, radical. A misleading line has been drawn connecting nonviolence (a very large, complex idea) to current methods of achieving social change. Nonviolence equals the status quo, the status quo is no change, nonviolence doesn’t work, Q.E.D. But rallies and Change.org petitions are a very small subset of nonviolent action, and it disingenuous to narrow the definition that much.

Gene Sharp lists 198 methods of nonviolent action, in a flyer that is circulated at certain activist events. I first saw it in Occupy in 2011. Other lists exist, Sharp’s is unusually exhaustive. But we can see that symbolic actions like petitions are a small part of the overall range of activity. The strike is fundamentally a nonviolent action- while it may involve violence in some cases, it is about using economic rather than physical weapons to seize political and social power. The difference between a Charge.org petition and hartal, a type of total general strike used in South Asia, is vast.

As Mark Kurlansky points out in Nonviolence: The History of a Dangerous Ideanonviolence is such a radical concept that there is no English word for it. We simply define it by what it is not rather than what it is. Mahatma Gandhi invented the term satyagraha in part because in order to advocate for nonviolence, one has to create a new mental framework.

Nonviolence is not just an appeal to an enemy’s conscience. This Stokely Carmichael (Kwame Ture) quote has been circulating recently.

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You can here the excerpt of this speech in the Black Power Mixtape here (video).

The thing is, as intuitive as that sounds, appealing to the conscience of one’s opponents is a very small part of nonviolent action. Gene Sharp admits that this strategy usually does not work:

Nonviolent struggle produces change in four ways. The first mechanism is the least likely, though it has occurred. When members of the opponent group are emotionally moved by the suffering of repression imposed on courageous nonviolent resisters or are rationally persuaded that the resisters’ cause is just, they may come to accept the resisters’ aims. This mechanism is called conversion. Though cases of conversion in nonviolent action do sometimes happen, they are rare, and in most conflicts this does not occur at all or at least not on a significant scale. (From Dictatorship to Democracyp. 35) (emphasis mine)

Put simply, the fact that nonviolent action proponents admit this straight up indicates that nonviolence is not just about converting enemies. Because that doesn’t work.

Nonviolence is effective. In 2012, Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan published a book, Why Civil Resistance Works, which is perhaps the most detailed study of both violent and nonviolent campaigns in the modern era. Their conclusions are clear:

For more than a century, from 1900 to 2006, campaigns of nonviolent resistance were more than twice as effective as their violent counterparts in achieving their stated goals. By attracting impressive support from citizens, whose activism takes the form of protests, boycotts, civil disobedience, and other forms of nonviolent noncooperation, these efforts help separate regimes from their main sources of power and produce remarkable results, even in Iran, Burma, the Philippines, and the Palestinian Territories . . .

Chenoweth and Stephan conclude that successful nonviolent resistance ushers in more durable and internally peaceful democracies, which are less likely to regress into civil war. Presenting a rich, evidentiary argument, they originally and systematically compare violent and nonviolent outcomes in different historical periods and geographical contexts, debunking the myth that violence occurs because of structural and environmental factors and that it is necessary to achieve certain political goals. Instead, the authors discover, violent insurgency is rarely justifiable on strategic grounds.

If nonviolence didn’t work, it would have died out a long time ago. Its continued presence is a testament to its ability to win victories for people, who may face enemies with significantly more guns and money.

Nonviolence sets a tactically superior battlefield. Nonviolence often uses similar language and concepts to violent action. In this case, a significant (and often unacknowledged) disadvantage that comes with violence is that it chooses a field of battle in which the enemy has every advantage. So you want to arm up and take on neo-Nazis? Then the police? The National Guard? Marines? Not only are all of these groups armed to the teeth, they all want to use violence. It’s what they’re good at. Choosing violence plays into their hands. You know what all these groups aren’t good at? Dealing with mass resistance. Strikes, boycotts, noncooperation. If they use violence in this context, it just creates more resistance. We already know this in practice- violence against communities in the War on Terror has created more opposition to U.S policy, not less.

Going forward, each activist has to make fundamental decisions. Part of making an educated decision is to see each option in its full depth. Advocates of armed struggle are tired of being mischaracterized and stereotyped, but can turn around and do the same things to advocates of civil resistance. This accomplishes nothing. And as both sides can agree, something must be accomplished, now and forever.

 

 

The Democrats and the death of SB 562

Over here in California, a considerable wave of excitement was building around SB 562, a bill that would can the current healthcare system in the state and replace it with a single-payer structure. For supporters, there was budding optimism. The current national framework created by the Affordable Care Act seems doomed, either through legislation or executive neglect. Polls indicated strong support, and though support dropped when the prospect of new taxes was raised, studies showed that implementation was probably not nearly as expensive as projected. The Democratic Party holds the governor’s office and has big majorities in both houses of the legislature. And single-payer had been passed twice during the Arnold Schwarzenegger administration.

But it died this week when Assembly Speaker Anthony Rendon shelved the bill. Activists I know are, as expected, absolutely livid. Part of the anger comes from how illogical SB 562’s death was. There was the means, motive, and opportunity to change things, but that didn’t happen. Political paralysis in a one-party state.

There are two ways to look at this. The first, pretty common among lifer Democrats, is that this was a bug in the system- SB 562 should have eventually become law, and there needs to be a couple small changes to make sure the next time (whenever that is) it succeeds.

The second is that this failure is a feature of the political system. A key piece of evidence is that single-payer has gotten through the obstacles that doomed it this time around, but in a different context:

Similar bills passed the legislature fairly easily in 2006 and 2008, only to be vetoed by then-Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. At a time when premiums were rising and there were few other proposals out there, it was an easy vote for Democrats certain of the governor’s veto.

When legislators craft bills that are guaranteed to receive a veto, what they produce is more marketing than ideology. Republicans and their endless ACA repeals passed between 2010 and the end of the Obama administration were this- political theater. In the theater, the chains of pharmaceutical and insurance influence are invisible. It tells activists that the Democratic Party can be the vehicle of progressive action, even if that never happens when cards are on the table. The California Democrats haven’t lifted a finger on higher education affordability, the housing shortage, and healthcare. The main shift since Brown took office is from purely symbolic action to milquetoast half-measures, which are passed but don’t change the trajectory of any social problems.

The failure of SB 562 will make Rendon a convenient boogeyman. There will undoubtedly be a campaign to remove him from office, or his position of power in the Assembly. It will disguise the truth: that both major parties take cash from the only groups that lose out in single-payer.

The Democratic Party feeds on the dreams of its most active members- it is the fuel that makes everything else happen. SB 562 didn’t die immediately, preserving the idea that the future is within the Party, and that the important thing is the next election. More time, more money, and what was promised will be fulfilled.

 

 

 

The Status Quo Time Loop

The one unifying characteristic of both Donald Trump’s campaign and those who have mobilized to stop him is the concept of change. This is not piercing insight. Trump promises to remake how America relates to both itself and the rest of the world. Most of “the resistance” talks about unprecedented organization, a new type of activism. This rhetoric remains the same, whether the speaker is a loyal Democrat or an ardent revolutionary.

But one must always be wary of false promises. The opposition linked to the Democratic Party may march alongside radicals, but at the end of the day their participation is linked to getting people and money to win the 2018 midterms. Policy is not a major part of the pitch. Stop Trump, priorities #1, #2, and #3.

This focus on becoming the opposition to a person, rather than an ideology, is dangerous. Fortunately, we have lessons from history. In David Broder’s piece in Jacobin, “Being Anti-Trump Isn’t Enough”, he takes the example of Italy, whose politics have been dominated for over twenty years by Trump-esque populist Silvio Berlusconi. In a short time, the former Communist Party had shifted so far to the right that they mirrored the Democrats, both in their party name and outlook. They upheld neoliberalism and austerity, and focused on Berlusconi’s scandals and outrageous statements, attempting to win disaffected conservatives. The Left atrophied, no longer being seen as a way to power. And all this concerted campaign against one man did was reinforce the status quo and produce weak, unstable governments.

The election of Tom Perez as DNC chair, along with subsequent events, shows that the Democratic establishment wants to roll into 2018 with the same outlook and message that lost them the 2016 election (well, and the 2010, 2012, and 2014 ones too, minus Obama’s re-election). The energy created by Trump’s election among progressives is fuel for an attempt to reintroduce the status quo. And if the Democratic Party gets its wish, the time loop restarts- the status quo doesn’t work for many people, right-wing populist seizes on this disaffection, gains power, creates opposition, opposition funneled to Democratic Party.

Whatever your opinion on Bernie Sanders and his presidential campaign, he was offering a possible way out of this time loop. Fixing the major social and economic problems in the country, or at least trying to, helps prevent another Trump down the line. With the current strategy, the Democrats aim to fight the same divisive election every two years, with climate change and a hundred other serious problems charging through unfixed.

The case for Marleau in the Hall of Fame

Very soon we will see something very rare, especially in an age where older NHL players spent their early years in the Dead Puck era- a player get 500 career goals, also with the same team. Patrick Marleau hit 1,000 points early last season, so this is the last big individual milestone of his career. It’s a testament to his durability and speed, even as he enters his late thirties.

Whenever anyone hits these kinds of milestones, the question emerges: will they one day enter the Hockey Hall of Fame? It’s tough to tell, because the standards for admission change over time. But we can do a rough pro/con for Marleau:

Con

  • No end year hardware. No Hart, Art Ross, Selke. He came extremely close to being a 2nd team all-star in 2010, with 151 votes to Daniel Sedin’s 153. In fact, he got kinda screwed: while 151 votes were for him as a left wing (his actual position that season), three votes for right wing. But hey, that doesn’t count as official.
  • Low points-per-game and goals-per-game: his 0.73 PPG and 0.34 GPG are pretty unimpressive. All time his PPG is 255th, though that includes some players with low career points, who also only played in their prime.
  • No Stanley Cup. His playoff performance is actually pretty good (that’ll be in the Pro section), but no Stanley Cup and Conn Smythe. This may change, and making the Cup Finals last season does give his playoff career some shine, even though he wasn’t that great last playoffs.
  • Never elite. Was never the best at his position.
  • Thornton effectMarleau had two above point-per-game seasons. In 2009-2010, when he scored 44 goals and 83 points, he was Thornton’s left wing. In 2005-2006, after Thornton was traded to the team in late November, Marleau played second-line center in easier minutes, ending up with 86 points.

Pro

  • Hits important career milestones for his position. 500 goals and 1,000 points are mandatory unless you were an Eric Lindros or Pavel Bure type. He will end up a fair bit higher, as he has shown the ability to score 20-25 goals and has not lost much of his speed. If he ends up with 550, say, which is believable given his durability, that would put him around 30th career wise. 1,150 to 1,200 points would put him in the top 50.
  • His adjusted stats are much better than his raw stats. Marleau played in the height of the trap, interference, no foot in the crease, and huge goalie equipment. By the end of the lockout he was already 26. This is regrettable because he has always been the speedy, skilled forward that was most hampered by Dead Puck Era rules and strategies. His career totals also have to deal with the fact that most other eras of hockey were higher scoring, especially the 1980s to mid-1990s. Marleau was drafted in 1997.

    But if we use adjusted points, an advanced stat that controls for era, he gains points and many above him lose. He is 26th in adjusted goals with 575, and 41st in adjusted points with 1,197. Marleau could probably crack the top 20 in goals and top 30 in points, which puts him above many Hall of Famers, and in company with other players with high totals but low per-game stats. He will probably end up above several players that are not in the Hall but are thought of being eventual inductees, like Dave Andreychuk and Jeremy Roenick.

  • High game-winning goals. Marleau has 97, 6th all time. Some may not find this stat important, but it looks good and gives Marleau a case for being a big game player, at least in the regular season.
  • Good playoff numbers. His playoff GPG is pretty good, similar to elite contemporary players. His 65 career playoff goals is 20th all-time. His stats are very similar to Joe Nieuwendyk and Mark Recchi, the former in the Hall and the latter a sure-fire inductee at some point in the next five years. Both players have a bunch of hardware, but can we blame Marleau for not putting up 34 points on the stacked early 90s Penguins, as Recchi did? Frequently, before and after the lockout, Marleau was the best player on his team in the post-season.
  • Two Olympic gold medals. Marleau was a very good member of both rosters, making the 2014 roster especially because he is such a complete player- can kill penalties, take face-offs, play wing or center. As is, they are a key part of Marleau’s case. If a Stanley Cup was added, the narrative about his career would flip almost instantly. The jury is still out.
  • History of sportsmanship. Marleau is a two-time Lady Byng finalist, and almost constantly in the top five-top ten each year. His low PIM totals and humble personality are not insignificant, given the conservative mores of the voters. Jeremy Roenick, who does not have a Stanley Cup, and will end up with fewer goals, is a huge jerk. If he had Marleau’s personality, he might already be in.

Is Marleau in the Hall of Fame, or will he be Hall of Very Good material. I think his adjusted points, game-winning goals, and gold medals are all things that put him with or above current or future Hall of Famers. Eventually the Hall starts inducting the second tier of players in an era- excellent stats, consistency, milestones, but lack the awards or year-end all-star honors because the superstars always had it. They wait, but eventually in a slow year one gets the nod. I doubt Marleau will be inducted in his first five years of eligibility, but ten, fifteen years?

Who knows.