Europe – Unspoken Politics

Will Russian expansion provoke a serious EU/NATO response?

When asked this question two days ago, I gave a long comment on the subject. Here’s what I wrote. It’s not meant to be authoritative, just my feelings as an American outsider. The question was both about Russia vs. EU/NATO, with special concern to Estonia, given rhetoric that seems similar to that over Crimea.

It’s not a rosy situation. A couple things are clear-

a) Russia let go of its regional control in the 1990s not because of the arrival of democracy (never arrived, insufficient postage or whatever) or the end of ultranationalism, but rather because at the time their economy had ground to a halt and everyone with a decent education was leaving for the West. They had no ability to project power, so they signed deals like the one with Ukraine that guaranteed its sovereignty.

b) Putin-era Russia clearly has a way of gaining territory. They support a nominal independence movement within a country. One may remember Abkhazia and South Ossetia as being the reasons for the Russians invading Georgia in 2008. They’ve done a similar thing with Transnistria in Moldova, which doesn’t even share a land border with Russia.

However, let’s be clear here. if Russia decides to invade a NATO nation- which includes the Baltic states- there will be serious retaliation beyond strong words. This isn’t just an American thing- one of the most important NATO nations historically is Turkey, who a) are now in a very strange position since they control the only way out of the Black Sea for Russia’s Crimean naval bases, b) just saw a half million Tatars (who are Muslim and Turkic) fall under the control of a very racist, ultranationalist power, and c) has hated Russia since the creation of Russia a millennia ago. The Ukraine wasn’t in NATO, or the EU, was very far to the east, and was politically unstable with a very weak military- a large portion of which defected. That’s not going to happen again.

NATO is a military alliance and not a theoretical one- Kosovo, Libya, Afghanistan. If they’re willing to fight on the other side of Asia, they’ll fight in their own backyards when it’s one of their members. Article 5 has been used, so it’s not just words on paper.

Regarding Estonia, there are some things to point out here. Estonia’s history under post-World War II Soviet control involved sending a lot of Russian speakers into the country to dominate it culturally. However, as the Christian Science Monitor points out in the featur e on the issue, a lot of them speak Russian, but are not ethnically Russian. Jews, Ukranians, Finns. They cite a poll that shows the Russian population there are split right down the middle on whether Crimea was a good things, with most having no opinion at all. Clearly if Estonia circled the wagons it’s not “Estonians vs. Russian speakers” clearly divided.

Of course, what a ‘conflict’ means is important. The Cold War had much bigger situations- for instance, the forcible blockade of Berlin. One will hope that the lack of top-level cooperation that made Soviet control of places like Czechoslovakia and Hungary possible (they used to have friendly Communist governments, now they’re run by the majority non-Russian groups) means that Russia will be checked. On the other hand, it’s difficult to envision a near future where eastern Ukraine isn’t drawn into the Russian orbit. It’s not like Libya- the Ukrainian government is also disorganized like the rebels there, but Gaddafi and the Russian military are two vastly different classes. If Russia occupies, there would need to be a superior force on the ground.

Unfortunately, the idiocy that was (and is) Afghanistan has really killed the whole “boots on the ground” idea- this is good in some sense since it makes diplomacy and other means more relied upon. However, some countries are too big to threaten. Russia and China are the two big ones.

Now I’m a strict non-violent proponent so I don’t think using military force to drive the Russian military off is the ‘right’ course of action. Sealing the Bosporus to military vessels contingent on Russia withdrawal, mixed with a large-scale boycott and freezing the billions upon billions of dollars the oligarchs have stashed in European countries might help, as some off-the-cuff ideas. Certainly making a concrete plan where NATO troops would be deployed to places like Estonia known would dissuade Russia occupation- just a note that there is something beyond ‘strong reservations’. The Warsaw Pact countries joined EU and NATO because they feared continued Russian control. Even if places like France are ambivalent, any former country under the Iron Curtain with a pocket of Russians knows that they are the next potential domino.

The fires return in Ukraine

Fires in Kiev.
Credit: David Mdzinarishvili/Reuters

After a lull where dialogue between the Ukrainian government and opposition was conducted and some concessions were agreed upon, a government raid on Independence Square in Kiev kicked off the deadliest day in the months of protests.

It is increasingly apparent that the western part of the country is no longer in firm government control. Compared to a mostly quiet east, it shows for outsiders the divisions that exist, and how they come to a head in the capital.

As Kiev burns

Protesters in Kiev, 23 Jan — Protestors amid carnage in Kiev // Credit: BBC

The protests in the Ukraine are intensified and now have their first fatalities. Such conflict should not be a surprise- the Ukraine has struggled since its independence from the Soviet Union to determine whether it will align with Russia or with Europe.

These protests are wide-ranging in scope and the groups that participate. Far-right groups, anti-corruption, those advocating a better democracy. What is clear is that the Ukrainian government led by President Viktor Yanukovych has lost a great deal of its legitimacy.

Spectacular photos of fireworks weaponry from the Ukraine protests — Protestors feed their smokescreen with burning tires. // Credit: Ilya Varlamov

uk15 — Riot police form a shield formation while attempting to disperse protestors. // Credit: REUTERS/Maks Levin

Is Europe in decline, confused, or just changed its methods?

Depending on how you shake it, the answer to all three parts could be “yes.”

The online version of the German paper Der Spiegel published an interview Friday with Walter Laqueur, a historian of Europe. At 92, he predates the Second World War, the division of Europe in half, and the rise of European integration and the eventual political and monetary union. With all this perspective, he has grown increasingly pessimistic about the future of the continent.

His central thesis is that Europe lacks the resources and willpower to project power globally, and have the kind of economic and military influence that the United States or China pursue. Staying on the sidelines, nevertheless, does not make you immune to the actions of others. As Howard Zinn titled his autobiography, You Can’t Be Neutral on a Moving Train. Laqueur responds to the idea that the current state of affairs is low-risk, musing:

I’m not so sure about that. Only time will tell. The Europeans haven’t quite understood that trying to stay out of the fray offers no protection against the consequences of global policy. Retreat offers no security against the consequences. Perhaps exaggerated caution is sometimes appropriate, but inaction can also prove to be disastrous.

Let it not be assumed that the United States has a superior foreign policy. If one believes that America is in decline, the human and economic cost of global military vigilance would be a key reason to think so. To use non-military influence, a state must have some amount of moral capital. But the credibility, for instance, of France is strained after their actions before and during the Rwandan Genocide- professor Howard Adelman found the military support (PDF, p. 6-10) for the Rwandan government leading up to the genocide to be “open” and “blatant.” Western inaction on Darfur creates a similar skepticism towards Europe being the go-to power bloc for countries and their conflicts.

Another question raised is that whether the wealth of Europe, and its comparatively advanced welfare states, removes incentive to be a global leader. Laqueur poses “Has material prosperity created a timid society…?” Two things quickly come into play here. Firstly, whether the large-scale debt crisis is changing any kind of timid behavior that may exist, and secondly whether wealthy countries are more able to assist and influence other countries.

As you learn in introductory psychology, Abraham Maslow proposed a “Hierarchy of Needs”- proposing that humans meet certain needs before progressing to less urgent needs. The fact that this pyramid inverted is also a theory shows that it is far from established canon- but nation-states may act like individuals in their priorities. A question to ask is whether wealth makes a nation more open or more reclusive on the world stage.

During these crisis years, several EU countries seem weeks away from total collapse- and unemployment is as bad or worse than America during the 1933 trough of the Great Depression. Thus the questions of where Europe is going in the mid-to-long term is very much in the background. When this crisis is staunched, what will European states do with their money and willpower? Is Europe committed to further integration, or have certain weak points scattered the consensus?

I don’t know if Laqueur is correct in his insights. Since he’s almost seventy years older than me, I have far less information to go on. It seems that what he laments in Europe is its loss of imperial ambitions. The portion of the world that was a colony of one power or another into the 20th century would be cautious of such a turn in attitude. But the trajectory of Europe will be of interest throughout the 21st century, even if the EU as a whole recedes behind new players in Asia, Africa, and South America.